Ayhan Kaya: Cultural Reification in Circassian Diaspora - Stereotypes, Prejudices and Ethnic Relations

Contemporary diaspora identities differ to a certain extent from conventional forms of diasporic formations in the sense that the former are no longer characterised by the overwhelming wish to return. Contemporary diasporas are built upon two principal pillars: modern communicative circuitry, and acts of exclusion by receiving societies. Deported by the Russians from their homeland in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Circassian tribes were welcomed by the Ottoman Empire for practical reasons. Since then they have been subject to several acts of both inclusion and exclusion by the Turkish Republic. They were also treated differently by their local neighbour groups. This paper claims that Circassian groups in diaspora have generated distinct ethnic and cultural identities depending on how they were recognised, or unrecognised, both by their neigbours and the Turkish state. Cultural reification, or essentialisation, becomes common practice among diaspora groups, providing them with a safe haven against misrepresentation, prejudice, exclusion and discrimination. Cultural reification not only adds to the construction of a sense of communality, but also serves as a way of doing politics for the Circassians in diaspora. Culture, then, not only remains a heritage, but also becomes a political strategy.

Keywords: Circassians; Diaspora; Identity; Cultural Reification; Turkey; Stereotypes

Our great-grandparents did not untie their bales for the first fifty years with the expectation of return to the homeland sooner or later; I, myself, haven’t yet untied the bale in my soul (30-year-old Abzekh male from Eskisehir, interview, July 2001).

Introduction

In the summer of 1998, Prince Ali of Jordan, who was raised by a Circassian family, organised a trip with a special team composed of ten security guards of the Jordanian King. They were all dressed in ‘authentic’ Circassian warrior costumes and accompanied by horses, which have a special place in Circassian culture. These riders travelled from Amman to North Caucasia through Syria and Turkey. They received a very warm welcome in those Circassian villages and towns they visited in both Syria and Turkey. Circassians in Turkey were in fact shocked at the sight of these authentically dressed Caucasian men with their horses, resembing mythical figures from beyond the Caucasian mountains. Every village organised festivals to welcome their kin. This was an opportunity for many Circassians, or Adygei as they call themselves, in Turkey to realise that there were other Circassians whose destiny is similar to their own. Those imagined distant kin had suddenly become real. This incident is just one of many indications of the recent Circassian ethnic resurgence in Turkey.1 Circassian associations and some Turkish TV channels (CNN Turk and NTV) recently broadcast the video-film of this journey to a wider audience. The video-film was accompanied by a soundtrack from Loreena McKennitt, who also belives herself to be of Circassian descent. The journey of the Prince of Jordan as well as many other contemporary forms of representation initiated through means of electronic capitalism contribute to the construction of a ‘community of sentiments’ (Appadurai 1997) amongst Circassians who live across borders. This journey has also made the Circassians in Turkey publicly visible.
This article has two principal aims, one of which is to apply diaspora studies to the Adygei-speaking Circassian diaspora in Turkey, using the primary conceptual tools of diasporic identities, globalisation, and cultural reification. The other purpose of the article is to scrutinise the processes of cultural reification among Circassian diaspora groups in Turkey. The findings presented here have been gathered from my own anthropological research conducted both in urban and rural spaces. In 2001 and 2002, I conducted field research in various cities from Samsun in the north to Hatay in the south; I visited cities such as Izmit, Adapazari, Bursa, Eskisehir, Tokat, Amasya, Corum, Ankara, Kayseri, Sivas, Kahramanmaras, and Reyhanli. This field research lasted more than four months in the company of two research assistants of Circassian origin (Umut Aksoy and Yenal Bilici). Most time was spent in Samsun and Kayseri, as well as in Istanbul, which are my main fields of interest as far as the ethnographic research is concerned. Ethnographic research made it possible for me to compare the processes of construction and articulation of Circassian cultural identities among the Adygei-speaking populations in both urban and rural spaces.
Throughout the fieldwork, I tried to avoid the use of two polar field research stances: the observer-as-participant and the participant-as-observer. Rather, I tried to maintain a balance between involvement and detachment. I spent time with the Circassians, getting to know them informally, but also trying to avoid becoming personally or emotionally involved with them in order to retain my objectivity. Furthermore, I also gathered 50 young people of Circassian origin with social science education backgrounds to initiate 563 pieces of 100-question structured interviews in Istanbul (150), Samsun (65), Kayseri (50), Eskisehir (35), Balıkesir (45), Ankara (25), Sivas (55), Antalya (15), Reyhanlı (13), Bursa (40), Amasya (17) and Düzce (53). Although these interviews were held separately from the anthropological research, open-ended questions on the processes of migration, articulation of culture, orientation towards the homeland, and political participation strategies have provided me with valuable data by which it was possible to draw a representative picture of the Circassian diaspora in Turkey.
The notion of Circassian (or Cherkess2 in Turkish) literally refers to a set of various Adygei-speaking tribes (Shapsugh, Abzekh, Ubikh, Kabardian, Besleney, Bjadugh and Hotquay tribes etc.) originating in North Caucasia. There are also other co-ethnic tribes which may be included within the definition of ‘Circassian’, i.e. Abkhaz, Chechen, Ingush, Karachai, Balkar and Dagistanis. These tribes differ from Adygei-speaking groups in terms of the separate languages they speak. The term ‘Circassian’ is actually a meta-identification created by outsiders to define those groups living in the North Caucasus. The term Adygei is the self-designation of the North Caucasian tribes speaking the language Adigabze, the Circassian language. Adygei-speaking Circassians have been the target groups of this research both in urban and rural areas. Nevertheless, some of the Abkhaz and Chechen speaking villages and neighbourhoods were also visited in order to see the reception of the Adygei-speaking populations by their kin. It should be noted here that Chechen and Abkhaz (north Black Sea coast, adjacent to Georgia) groups are not included in the Adygei-Circassian identity by the Adygei-speaking people, and they tend to define themselves in terms of their distinct tribal identities. Yet, those Abkhaz groups, also called Abkhazin, who originate from the lands neigbouring the Kabardian region in the North Caucasus, define themselves as Circassian and are also defined by the Adygei-speaking population as such.
What is especially striking is the differentiation of the Adygei-speaking groups from the other groups of Caucasian origin in terms of their orientation to religion, Circassianhood, distinct tribal pride, mother tongue, homeland, authenticity, and Circassian fellowship. Another field research that I conducted in the Adygei Republic, Karacay-Cherkesk Republic and Kabardian-Balkar Republic in the Caucasus, has provided me with the opportunity to compare the Circassian diaspora groups with those in the homeland on the basis of their respective orientation to religion, ethnicity, fellowship, language, authenticity, and cultural reification. The latest stage of the field work was held in the North Caucasus in the winter of 2002. 3

Discursive Shift from ‘Exile’ to ‘Diaspora’

The dissolution of the USSR and the development of transportation and communication technologies have brought about remarkable changes in the habitats of meaning of the Circassian communities in Turkey. These recent developments have led to the rise of links between homeland and diaspora as well as to changes in the discourses of the Circassian populations in Turkey. Thus, one theoretical hypothesis to be explored is that the increase in the pace of linkages with the homeland after the dissolution of the USSR has brought about the construction of a strong modern diasporic identity among the Circassians, which springs from the growing public awareness of various scattered groups around the world in distant locations, especially in the Middle East. These recent changes have not only led to the construction of a diasporic consciousness but also depreciated some of the key notions previously in circulation among the Circassian population in Turkey. For instance, both qualitative and quantitative data gathered during my research have revealed that the term ‘exile’ had great currency among the Circcassian communities until the late 1980s. However, the dissolution of the USSR and direct encounters of some Circassians with their homeland led to the term ‘exile’ being replaced by the concept of diaspora. The term ‘exile’ was widely used by Circassians in Turkey, referring to the discourse of the romanticised wish to return to the homeland at a time when there was almost no material link with the homeland. During the Soviet regime, links with the North Caucasus were very limited for Circassians in diaspora. Circassians living in the northern parts of Turkey were able to receive Soviet radio channels broadcasting in Adigabze from North Caucasus. Alongside the myths, lyrics, songs, music, cuisine and language brought from the homeland, these broadcasts were one of the rare spaces connecting homeland and diaspora. The deployment of the diaspora discourse corresponds to a time when, for a limited number of people at least, a real encounter with the homeland became possible. Those returnees then had the opportunity to understand that they could live on both banks of the river, in both homeland and diaspora, by means of modern networks of communication and transportation.
Recently, the notion of diaspora has been extensively used by a wide range of scholars aiming to contribute to the definition of transnational migrants. The new trend of diaspora studies defines diasporas as exemplary communities of transnational moment. The term ‘diaspora’ is derived from the Greek verb sperio (to sow, to scatter) and the preposition dia (through, apart). The concept is used in several academic traditions.
Contemplating contemporary diasporic situations as an unsurprising feature of globalisation, Vertovec (1997) states that there are four different approaches to the contemporary notion of diaspora, as put forward by contemporary scholars.

• The first standpoint regards diaspora as a social form (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993; Cohen 1997; Safran 1991; Van Hear 1998; Wahlbeck 1999). Diaspora as a social form refers to transnational communities whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of nation-states.
• The second approach conceives diaspora as a type of consciousness, which emerges by means of transnational networks (Clifford 1992, 1994; Cohen 1997; Gilroy 1987, 1993; Hall 1991; Kaya 2001; Vertovec 1997). This approach springs from W.E.B. Du Bois’ notion of ‘double consciousness’, and refers to individuals’ awareness of being simultaneously ‘home away from home’ or ‘here and there’.
• The third approach is the understanding which regards diaspora as a mode of cultural construction and expression (Gilroy 1987, 1993, 1994). This approach emphasises the flow of constructed styles and identities among diasporic people.
• A fourth approach emphasises the political dimension of contemporary diasporas (Sheffer 1986, 1995). This approach particularly addresses the importance of political relations between diaspora, homeland and country of settlement.

These models are beneficial in developing a general framework for the processes in which Circassian diasporic subjects produce, reproduce and articulate their identities. In doing so, Circassian diasporic communities can be explored in terms of the social forms, double consciousness, and cultural construction and articulation. Nevertheless, this study will primarily follow the footsteps of the second approach, analysing the Circassian diaspora goups with regard to the ways in which their cultural and ethnic identities are constructed and articulated in diaspora.
William Safran (1991) draws up the general framework of an ‘ideal type’ of diaspora. He defines diaspora as ‘expatriate minority communities’

• that are dispersed from an original centre to at least two peripheral places;
• that maintain a memory, vision or myth of their original homeland;
• that believe they are not fully accepted by their host country;
• that see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return, when the time is right;
• that are committed to the maintenance and restoration of this homeland; and
• whose group consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by this continuing relationship with the homeland.

Safran’s ideal type of ‘centred’ diaspora, oriented by continuous cultural connections to a source and by a teleology of ‘return’, is very applicable to Circassian diaspora. The six criteria listed above are matched in the following ways:

• Circassians have been dispersed to more than one location outside the homeland since the mid-nineteenth century (the Balkans, Anatolia, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Germany, the USA, Holland and even Egypt in earlier times).
• Circassian subjects in Turkey maintain a memory, vision or myth of their original homeland (an increasing number of Circassian publishing houses in Turkey have published books on Circassian mythology, history of migration, the role of Circassians during the Turkish war of independence, and the reception of Circassians by the ‘host’ society in Turkey).
• It could be argued that Circassians in Turkey have developed a common belief that they are not very well received by the majority society (increasing consciousness of returning to the homeland partly derives from such a perception).
• Circassians have always considered going back to their homeland. The descendants of the first generation tell of how their ancestors always articulated their will to return to the homeland. The same discourse is still alive, and furthermore there are Circassians who have already returned home.
• Circassians are conscious of investing in their homeland (the International Circassian Association, composed of diaspora and homeland community members, assembles each year to develop plans for Northern Caucasia).
• When Circassians in Turkey are asked to identify where home is for them, they usually point to Caucasia (annual trips back home; listening to the Adygei radio broadcasting from Maykop; sending young people to the universities in Maykop and Nalchik).

Above all, it should also be stated that both qualitative and quantitative data have revealed that Circassians have been widely and consciously using the term ‘diaspora’ (Turkish vernacular ‘diyaspora’) in their daily discourse.
The concept of diaspora should be regarded as an analytical tool that can be used to study forced migrant communities in the country of ‘exile’. However, it has to be explicitly stressed that, in order to be an analytical tool the concept has to be seen as an ideal type in the Weberian sense of the term—as an abstraction of features from empirical reality and ‘ideal’ in the sense that it never exists in a ‘pure’ form in reality. Thus, the use of the term ‘Circassian diaspora’ throughout this paper should be interpreted as an attempt to explain the ways in which Circassians have seen themselves away from home.

Flows of Globalisation

The construction of contemporary diasporic consciousness owes a lot to the processes of globalisation. The wide networks of communication and transportation between Turkish-Circassians and Caucasia, for instance, play a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of a diasporic identity among the Circassian population in Turkey. Modern circuitry connects diasporic subjects both to the homeland and to the rest of the world. Thus, it becomes much easier for them to live on ‘both banks of the river’ at the same time, both in diaspora and homeland. The changing nature of space and time in the age of globalism facilitates the emergence of diasporic consciousness. Globalisation—seen as the growth of communications, transportation, migration, de-monopolisation of national legal systems, new international divisions of labour, and global culture—empowers minorities against the hegemony of the nation-state, and breaks up conventional power relations between majority and minority. Modern communicative circuitry has enabled dispersed populations to converse, interact and even symbolise significant elements of their social and cultural lives (Gilroy 1994: 211). The enhancement of telecommunications and ease of travel made possible the emergence of alternate cultural forms and multiple identities for diasporic groups. Modern communication networks such as the internet have also brought about a ‘diasporic interchange’ and ‘diasporic intimacy’ among Circassian peoples in the diaspora struggling against displacement, uprootedness, exclusion and capitalist exploitation in their countries of settlement. In recent times, hundreds of e-mail groups throughout the world connect various Circassian groups, from Canada and New Jersey to Turkey and Jordan.4
Recently, scheduled flights from Istanbul and Trabzon to Krasnodar (Adygei Autonomous Republic), and scheduled ferries to Soçi and Sohum increase the interconnectedness between diaspora and homeland. Circassian radio programmes broadcasting from Maykop are easily received in Turkey by the Circassians. The recruitment of Caucasian folk-dance teachers brought from the North Caucasus is also very common throughout the diaspora. On the other hand, sending students across the water, mostly to Maykop and Nalchik, for the purposes of language training and university education has become another common practice among the Turkish-Circassians. The official publication of the International Circassian Association is also widespread in Turkey through the activities of the Circassian ethnic associations.5 These instruments connecting the diaspora with the homeland contribute to the formation of a diasporic Circassian identity as well as to the construction of a form of ‘globalisation from below’ (Brecher et al. 1993).
Contemporary diaspora consciousness requires the idea of dwelling here in the country of residence, and a connection there in the homeland facilitated by the processes of globalisation. Diasporic discourses, as Clifford (1994: 311) has stated, reflect the sense of being part of an ongoing transnational network that includes the homeland, not as something left behind, but as a place of attachment in a ‘contrapuntal modernity’. Through the agency of modern circuitry, diasporic subjects have the chance to create a home away from the homeland; a home surrounded by rhythms, sounds, figures, motives and images of the homeland provided by radio, video cassettes, tapes, and by the local networks they develop over time. Circassian villages in Turkey especially, provide such a cultural and spatial circuitry: their architectural structure, detached houses with huge gardens, public fora in villages, very well preserved ecological structure, languages spoken, distinct dances, public courts established to sort out communal disputes, myths, courtship rituals, celebrated institution of hospitality, Zekes nights,6 and Circassian cuisine.

Circassian Population in Turkey

Turkey is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country, housing approximately 50 different Muslim and/or non-Muslim ethnic groups: Sunni Turks, Alevi Turks, Sunni Kurds, Alevi Kurds, Circassians, Lazis, Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs, Assyrians etc.7 However, leaving aside the attempts made at democratisation in the last decade, the Turkish state has been far from recognising the ethnically and culturally diverse nature of Turkish society since the foundation of the Republic in 1923. Ethnic groups in Turkey have been subject to homogenising state policies, some of which originate in the nationalist Turkish history thesis of 1932, placing the Turks into the centre of world civilisation; in the Sun Language Theory (1936) addressing the Turkish language as the mother of all languages in the world; in unitarian nationalist education policies (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu, 1924); in the banning of the use of mother-tongue and ethnic-minority names; in discriminatory settlement policies (İskân Kanunu, 1934) vis-à-vis exchange populations and new migrants (Çağaptay 2002); in discriminatory citizenship laws granting citizenship exclusively to Muslim migrants; in the levying of the Wealth Tax in 1942, particularly on non-Muslims; and in the forced migration of Kurds in the east and south-east of Turkey (Aktar 2000; Bali 1999; Yıldız 2001).
Retrospectively speaking, ethnic groups in Turkey such as Kurds, Circassians, Alevis, Armenians, Lazis and Arabs have developed various political participation strategies vis-à-vis the legal and political structure and delimitations. While the Turkish Republic was being built up in the 1920s, the republican political elite were highly engaged in a strong ideology of majority nationalism, which promoted the formation of an ethnically and culturally homogenous nation. At that time, most ethnic groups preferred to incorporate themselves into this nation-state project and discourse; they abstained from declaring their ethnic identities in public and considered themselves as one of the constituents of the Turkish Republic. The defining distinctiveness of the early Republic was Turkification policies, which sought the dominance of Turkishness and Islam as the defining elements in every walk of life, from the language spoken in the public space to citizenship, national education, trade, personnel regimes in public enterprise, industrial life and even settlement laws (Aktar 2000). Having an Imperial legacy, many such new regulations and laws referred to a set of attempts to homogenise the entire nation without any tolerance for diversity and difference. It is highly probable that the underestimation of ethnic diversity among the Muslim population of the Republic was due to the preceding Ottoman Millet system being borrowed by the republican political elite. This Millet system did not consider ethnic differences among Muslims. All Muslims, regardless of their other differences, belonged to the one and the same ‘Muslim nation’.
These kinds of assimilationist and/or exclusionist state policy have eventually shaped the ways in which ethnic groups developed their identities. In order to survive in Anatolia, former generations of ethnic groups preferred to assimilate into mainstream political culture in Turkey, which was dominated by homogeneity, Sunni Islam and Turkishness. The work of Moiz Kohen Tekinalp (a Turkish nationalist of Jewish origin), Turkification (Türkleştirme, 1928), is illuminating in the sense that he pointed out the main incorporation strategies for non-Turkish ethnic minorities within the political system. He proposed 10 commandments to the Turkish-Jews for their incorporation into the Turkish nation-building process: 1. Turkify your names; 2. Speak Turkish; 3. Pray in Turkish in synagogues; 4. Turkify your schools; 5. Send your children to Turkish schools; 6. Get engaged in national issues; 7. Stick together with Turks; 8. Affiliate yourself with the community spirit; 9. Fulfil your duties in the national economy; 10. Be aware of your rights (cited in Landau 1996). Although Tekinalp’s commandments may, at first glance, seem to correspond only to non-Muslims in Turkey, there is also strong evidence that those commandments also apply to some Muslim communities such as Kurds and Circassians (Yıldız 2001).
Being subject to forced migration from the north Caucasus; having been settled in separate geographies; being both excluded and included in the process of nation-state building by the political and military elite of the 1920s;8 being subject to the assimilationist Turkish Republican policies after 1920s; the ban on the use of mother-tongue and Circassian names by the Turkish Republic; these and many other exclusionist policies eventually shaped the ways in which Circassians developed their identities. Furthermore, Circassians have usually been presented by the political elite and professional intellectuals as a part of Turkish heritage, or as Turkish tribes. Thus, their state of being different has hitherto been denied. In what follows, some informative data will be provided in order to expose the rationale behind Circassian existence in Turkey since the beginning of their exile experience in the second half of the nineteenth century.
When the Russian expansion started in the Northern Caucasus in the early nineteenth century, Circassians had to find refuge from the Russian atrocities. The eventual result of Russian success in the region was a series of refugee movements in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, by boat, cart and on foot, from North Caucasia to the Ottoman Empire.9 The Circassians considered Istanbul, then centre of the Muslim world, to be the safest place to ask for refuge. Thus began the flight of thousands of Circassians to the Ottoman Empire. The refugees arrived in waves during 1860–65 and following the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–78. The number of refugees is a matter of contention with figures ranging from 500,000 to 2 million (Berkok 1958; Karpat 1985). It is estimated that approximately 20 per cent of this number died of malnutrition and disease. Those who remained in the Caucasus, between 150,000 and 200,000, were compelled to resettle in the northern plains of the Caucasus where they were easier to control (Jaimoukha 2001: 69).
The Ottoman government faced immediate problems in integrating these new subjects. Nevertheless they constituted human capital for a country ravaged in successive wars, economically impoverished, and increasingly overwhelmed by separatist movements in the Balkans, the Middle East and south-east Anatolia. The new human capital primarily served the Ottoman government in two ways: as a manpower source for the Ottoman army, and as a buffer against separatist powers in the country. The Ottoman government accommodated refugees in some very particular places where there had already been centrifugal forces in opposition to the Sublime Porte such as the Kurdish, Balkan and Arab nationalists. Therefore, the Circassians were at first considered by the Ottoman political elite to be a kind of balancing instrument and a new stock of military potential for the future of the Empire. They were often used as security detachments and pioneers in remote and uncontrollable areas (Dündar 2001: 130–4). As a reliable, countervailing force used to interdict and discipline Kurds, Turkoman, Druze, Bedouin and other nomads, they were an asset to the Empire from a demographic and military standpoint.10

Identities and Cultural Reification in Diaspora

Before describing the particular aspects of cultural reification among the Circassians in diaspora, let me briefly outline the principal dynamics of identity and ethnicity, which are primarily subject to the ways in which the ‘self’ and/or ‘minority group’ is treated by the ‘other’ and/or majority society. Our identity, be it individual, political, communal, ethnic or national, is shaped by recognition, non-recognition or mis-recognition of the ‘other’ (Taylor 1994: 25). The genesis of the human mind develops in a dialogical sense, not monologically. We can construct our identities only if we are able to experience others’ reactions to our attitudes and behaviour. Unless we are defined by others, we cannot represent ourselves. Thus, it is impossible to build an identity without a dialogue with the ‘other’.
Considering the perpetual encounters with the constitutive ‘others’, identities, as Stuart Hall (1991: 47) has stated, ‘are never completed, never finished; they are always in process of formation’. If we go further, we can argue that the condition of existence of every identity is the affirmation of a difference, the determination of an ‘other’ that is going to play the role of a ‘constitutive outside’. Likewise, the construction of ethnic identity follows a similar path. Fredrik Barth (1969, 1994) has convincingly articulated the notion of ethnicity as mutable, arguing that ethnicity is the product of social ascriptions, a kind of labelling process engaged in by oneself and others. In the Barthian approach, ethnic identity is regarded as a feature of social organisation, rather than a nebulous expression of culture. Thus, one’s ethnic identity is a composite of the view one has of oneself as well as the views held by others about one’s ethnic identity. To put it differently, ethnic identity is the product of a dialogical and dialectical process involving internal and external opinions and processes, as well as the individual’s self-identification and outsiders’ ethnic designations—i.e, what you think your ethnicity is, versus what they think your ethnicity is (Nagel 1994: 154). Ethnic boundaries, and thus identities, are explicitly socially constructed in relation to the ‘Other’. The construction of Circassian diaspora identities cannot be separated from the ways in which they have been recognised, unrecognised, or misrecognised by the other neighbouring groups. For instance, the Circassians constitute the majority (mostly Kabardian) in Uzun Yayla with non-Circassian Turkish nomads, Yoruks, living in the surrounding villages. That is why cultural and ethnic identities constructed and articulated by the Circassians in Kayseri differ from those formed and articulated in other regions.
According to figures given by Andrews (1992) there are around 900 Circassian villages in Turkey. This number should be increased as he did not include some villages in eastern and south-eastern Anatolia. There are also great numbers in big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Samsun. During the fieldwork I recently conducted through a vertical belt between Samsun and Reyhanli-Hatay, and in Istanbul and the western Black Sea regions (Adapazarı and Duzce), I have come to see that most of these Circassian villages are still alive, despite strong waves of migration throughout the last two decades. Many are still very well preserved by permanent inhabitants and seasonal returnees.
What is striking about these villages is that the understanding of public space and private space is very different from that of the majority Sunni Turkish villages. Unlike the Sunni Turkish villages, Circassians build their houses at a distance to each other. There is usually no concern for seclusion among Circassians as there is no tradition of kaç-göç (the practice of women covering their faces in the presence of men). Circassian villages, in this sense, provide us with an illustrative example in referring to the fact that seclusion is actually a concern in places where there is no seclusion as such. Circassian villagers also possess a strong environmental consciousness. One could, for instance, easily understand which villages belong to the Circassians in Anatolia: those that still have forests (e.g. Fakıhahmet village in Corum—a Central Anatolian town). The cult of the tree in Circassian mythology is believed to be one of the reasons for their environmental consciousness.11
Living as a minority, often in wider territories dotted by clusters of Circassian villages, had positive results as well as negative ones in the maintenance of identity. Adequate numbers of people migrated to Turkey during the exile in the late nineteenth century for a real sense of community to emerge in the pockets in which they eventually settled. Overall, North Caucasians exhibited tribal unity in their new diaspora settings and a popular commitment to maintaining their traditional culture. Maintenance of traditions and reification of culture in diaspora such as khabze,12 haynape,13 thamade,14 Zekes, düğün,15 Kashen,16 Semerkho,17 Istanbulako,18 folk dances, folk songs, cuisine and hospitality all have a special significance in the process of constructing a symbolic home away from the homeland. These diasporic spaces fostered by the processes of cultural reification provide the Circassians with a symbolic wall, fortress or safe haven protecting them against misrepresentation, prejudices, exclusion and discrimination. Accordingly, the sense of being a member of a ‘different’ people with historical roots and destinies outside the time/space of the ‘host’ nation provides them with distinction and pride.

Stereotypes, Prejudices and Ethnic Relations

Circassian pride is, in general, overwhelmingly celebrated by Circassians vis-à-vis non-Circassian groups in Turkey. Turks are stereotypically called Tlepagh among the Circassians themselves. Tlepagh is a Circassian term, which means short, plump, fat, and dwarf. Turks are usually belittled and made fun of. The notion of Turk, as used by Circassians, is also very problematic. What is meant by ‘Turk’ is generally non-Circassian. The notion of ‘Turk’ is considered to be homogeneous, whereas it may, in fact, connote various ethnic groups such as Sunni Turks, Yoruks, Turkomans, Turkish-Alevis, sometimes even Kurds. The way the term ‘Turkish’ is constructed by Circassians indicates that Circassians in Turkey have come across various exclusionary acts throughout history.19
There are also strongly manifested stereotypes developed, especially by Sunni-Turks, for Circassians. Relatively more democratic gender relations amongst the Circassian population in rural areas may prompt surrounding Sunni-Turks to develop certain stereotypes. These stereotypes mainly involve the common belief that Circassians commit sin and disgraceful acts among themselves. Another stereotype is that Circassians are thieves—a belief used more often in reference to Abkhaz people. This stereotype has its roots in the beginning of the migration process, when Circassians were believed to break into locals’ properties due to the difficulties of adaptation to the new life in Anatolia. Similar narratives are still being vocalised not only among the non-Circassian rural population in Anatolia, but also by the Circassians themseves.
Such stereotypes between the two groups in rural areas pose a great obstacle between Turks and Circassians. Both my anthropological research and structured interviews conducted in rural districts reveal a limited tendency for marriage between Circassians and ethnic Turks. As endogamy is not allowed within the community, the Circassians prefer to marry candidates either from other Adygei, Abkhaz or Chechen tribes, or Georgians, Mübadils20 and Muhacirs.21 Structured interviews reveal that Georgians, Mübadils and Muhacirs are some of the groups with whom Circassians affiliate more. The source of this affiliation with such groups, despite the fact that there is an ongoing war between Abkhaz and Georgian peoples in the Caucasus, and that both Mübadils and Muhacirs are ethnically Turkish, is quite remarkable. Ethnographic research has revealed that it is the experience of migration which brings about a kind of intimacy between these groups.22
Gender relations among Circassians deserve further elaboration. It is commonly believed and expressed that gender relations are more democratic and equal within the community compared to other groups in Turkey. The absence of kaç-göç practices between men and women, the practices of Kashen (and psethluk), düğüns, Zekes nights and Semerkho are all rituals preparing the ground for courtship and relatively equal gender relations. These rituals provide Circassian men and women with a space to negotiate their potential union. Gender attraction is usually evident in the public space formed by such rituals. It is also highlighted most distinctly in Circassian dances, which are couple dances and simulate unions in which elegance, pride and respect prevail. However, gender relations in practice are not as egalitarian as discursively and mythically claimed (Ertem 2000).
There are also some stereotypes manufactured within the diaspora. To illustrate this point, it is stereotypically believed by Circassians that ‘Ubikhs are those with a talent for speaking well and a reputation for gentleness’ (most literate); ‘Abzekhs beg the best’ (religiously oriented); ‘Shapsughs swear the worst’ (most illiterate and mountainous people); ‘Abkhaz people are religiously more tolerant’; and ‘Kabardians are very much bound by their traditions’ (most traditional and conservative people). The sources of these ethnic labels can be traced back to the life-worlds of these tribes in Caucasus. These ethnic labels, as well as stereotypes and prejudices, derive from the ways in which cultural differences are socially constructed. Social organisation of cultural differences, which is shaped by ecological and demographic factors (Barth 1969), corresponds to the construction of ethnic groups and boundaries.
Circassians in Turkey also display different characteristics regarding their relation to ‘authentic’ Circassian traditions, Islam and modernity. Circassian traditions are generally applied both in urban and rural space. Khabze (customary law), Haynape (disgraceful), hospitality, respect, joy, and the ‘potlatch economy’ are the pillars of these traditions, and they are all carried out in the diaspora context. An 88-year-old man from Pinarbasi, Kayseri, whom I interviewed in 2002, defines the 12 fundamentals of the Khabze: 1) The one having the sword at war, and the tongue on the floor is our leader; 2) Nobility is required in community; 3) Generosity means nobility; 4) Prosperity and material wealth are the signs of haynape (disgracefulness) for the nobleman; 5) Pride is not a sign of nobility; 6) Nobility means prosperity; 7) The source of nobility is intelligence, shame, and modesty; 8) Nobility is not hereditary, and nobility requires virtue; 9) Custom is what is always applicable; 10) Don’t be two-faced; 11) First come my parents, followed by family, village, tribe, nation and the world; and 12) Endogamy is not allowed. All these rules still prevail to a certain extent in the rural environment.
Hospitality and respect are also very essential among the Circassians. Hospitality is a requirement of Circassian ‘authenticity’. The importance of hospitality is still visible in the architecture of the rural Circassian houses; the guestroom is in the entrance of the house, giving a free space to guests. And the norm is not to ask the guest about the purpose of his/her visit for three days. Those labelled as inhospitable are excluded from the community. Respect is another way of communal inclusion. It is not a one-way ritual going from the younger generations to the older generations, but also the other way around. Inter-generational respect symbolises the sacredness of what is communal. Rather, hospitality and respect seem to be two celebrated institutions contributing to the construction and reconstruction of the sense of community. Hence, these institutions remain limited to the community in the rural space. Non-Circassians (mostly Sunni Turks) are excluded by their Circassian neighbours from such institutions as a reaction to the negative stereotypes that have been developed by them.
Although such commonalities exist for Circassians living in Turkey, their relation to Islam varies. In rural regions, for instance, those villages which are surrounded by Sunni Turkish villages are more oriented towards religion. It is likely that Circassians inhabiting these kinds of villages find it more reasonable to assimilate to the Sunni-Turkish way of living. This form of life requires them to practice Islam in the public space as a survival strategy, and keep the constituents of Circassian culture within the private space. Nevertheless, in some of the villages located in Carsamba, a district of Samsun (middle Black Sea region), this assimilation goes to the extent that performing Circassian folk dances is considered to be haynape (disgraceful) by Circassians themselves.
Survival strategies of minority groups employed to be recognised by the locals change from one location to the other. In some Circassian villages surrounded by neighbouring Sunni-Turkish villages in Çorum (mid-east of Anatolia), Circassians play musical instruments such as the Davul (drum) and Zurna,23 which are not recognised at all by other Circassians living in other places such as Kayseri. Furthermore, affiliation with Turkish nationalism is also a popular survival strategy among some of the Circassian groups settled in Samsun and Kayseri; there are many ultra-Turkish nationalists in those regions who are involved in the Nationalist Action Party.
Ethnographic field research in rural areas in Samsun, Çorum (northern Anatolia) and Kayseri (mid-east Anatolia) indicates that religion is an efficient tool for those Circassians encircled by the local Sunni-Muslim Turks, permitting the Circassians to be recognised by the locals.24 Thus, emphasising cultural similarities such as religion becomes a strategising tool for migrants for their politics of identity and recognition. Some other reasons for the deep-rooted religiosity of the Circassians in various locations in Turkey could also spring from the pan-Islamist ideology put forward by Sultan Abdulhamid II to incorporate new incoming Muslims with the local Muslim populations. Therefore, religiosity might have been a rational survival strategy for Circassians and other Muslim immigrants since the late-nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire.
In fact, most Circassian tribes (but not the Chechens) embraced the Islamic religion up to 300–400 years ago. Chechens adopted Islam almost 1,000 years ago under Arabic influence. By the fifteenth century, most of Chechnya had been converted to Islam.25 That is why Chechens are known to have deep-rooted Islamic sentiments. The difference in religious orientation has recently led to the reinforcement of ethnic boundaries between Circassians and Chechens. Circassians, Adygei-speaking tribes, have become eager to express this religious difference as there is now a lively discussion in Turkey concerning religious fundamentalism. Thus, it becomes rational and strategically essential for Adygei-speaking people to emphasise their distinction of not having a fundamentalist Islamic orientation. It should also be noted here that ethnic identities are subject to changes in political conjuncture. The definition of Circassianhood in the 1990s included the Chechens. However, the emergence of the Chechen revival in the Russian Federation with a strong fundamentalist Islamic undercurrent has had a great impact on the redefinition of Circassian identity in Turkey in a way that created a boundary between Adygei-speaking Circassians and Chechens. There were two reasons behind this identity shift. Principally, Turkey withdrew its support from the Chechens in Chechnya during the coalition government of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), Motherland Party (ANAP) and National Action Party (MHP), and implemented a rapprochement policy with Russia, intensifying economic and political ties between the two countries. Turkey’s official policy change regarding the Russian Federation resulted in identity changes within the Circassian groups in Turkey. Thus, Circassian associations have partly withdrawn their support from the Chechens in order to comply with the ‘official’ discourse of Turkish political autorities. Secondly, common opposition against fundamentalist Islam in Turkey and abroad has also prompted the Circassians to put a distance between themselves and the Chechens, who are predominantly represented in the Russian Federation and elsewhere as Islamic fundamentalists. Thus, Circassian associations such as Kaf-Der and the Circassian Democratic Platform have started underlining their secular character.26
Nevertheless, there is a common denominator among the Circassian tribes, i.e. the popular discourse addressing their ‘addiction to joy’. Almost all Circassians interviewed stereotypically expressed their excessive fondness towards ‘enjoyment’. Mostly, this common attitude is pointed out as the primary reason for the poverty of the Circassian diaspora in Turkey. Although this general remark made by diasporic subjects is commonly phrased without any material and objective reference, it has a certain value in itself. In fact, this statement calls our attention to the fact that Circassians have so far applied an anti-capitalist economic system. Unlike the Weberian thesis underlining the Protestant ethic as the main driving force behind the capitalist socio-economic system, Circassians have instead adopted another ethical model as their socio-economic system: the potlatch system (Mauss 1990). While in the capitalist economic system, social wealth and welfare are based on work, investment, saving, and commodification of goods and services, the potlatch system essentially rests on the idea of ‘feeding’, ‘consuming’ and hospitality. In the capitalist system, the source of power is money and material wealth, whereas in the potlatch system it is the ‘gift’ which delivers legitimate power. What is taken in return for the gift is loyalty and power. A Circassian subject is expected to consume for his/her guests in accordance with his/her social status. This act of consuming for others is essentially patriarchal, and reproduces traditional power relations within Circassian communities.
All these intra- and inter-cultural differences as practiced by Circassians in Turkey contribute to the identification of individuals both as a fellow member of a tribe (such as Shapsugh, Abzekh, Ubikh, Kabardian, etc.) and/or as a fellow member of the Circassian diaspora. The social organisation of cultural differences refers to the construction of intra- and inter-ethnic boundaries. The dichotomisation of others as strangers, as members of another tribe and/or ethnic group, depicts recognition of limitations on shared understandings, differences in criteria for judgment of value and performance (Barth 1969: 15).

Conclusion

This article has attempted to scrutinise the processes of cultural reification performed by Circassian diaspora groups in Turkey as a counter-attack in self-defence in the history of the Turkish Republic. The author has claimed that contemporary diasporic identities are formed on two principal bases: the means of modern communicative circuitry connecting the diaspora and homeland; and exclusionary social, political, legal and cultural policies of the receiving society, distancing and othering the ‘other’. The first aspect addresses the modern and globalised nature of contemporary diasporas, while the second corresponds to their particularist nature. Modern circuitries of communication and transportation have made it possible for migrants and their descendants to live simultaneously on ‘both banks of the river’ in a way that leads to the demise of the quest for return. On the other hand, for many people living in diaspora, cultural baggage brought from home is an absolutely vital element in the negotiation of identity, but it comprises a renovated set of practices and discourses, too. Reification of culture serves as a social strategy for the diasporic individual. By reifying culture, and maintaining pre-immigrant social networks (hemsehri, fellowship) and familial connections, immigrants attempt to adapt in the diasporic context where they find themselves alone without the traditional support systems with which they were brought up. Culture is a continuous process of change, which is transformed into a heritage by migrants. In other words, for diasporic communities cultural processes are transformed into cultural heritage that may be reified in order to enculturate young generations and to construct a cultural fortress of their own in relation to that of the majority society.
Remaking or recovering the past and its culture serves at least a dual purpose for diasporic communities. Firstly, it is a way of coping with the conditions of the present without being very critical about the status quo. Secondly, it also helps to regenerate a sense of self which is not dependent on criteria handed down by others—the past is what diasporic subjects can claim as their own (Ganguly 1992: 40). The quest for authenticity, in fact, springs from diasporic subjects’ rationality and politicisation, but not from their parochialism. This shows that culture remains as a ‘dimension of phenomena’ (Appadurai 1997: 13) even when it seems to be substantialised and reified by diasporic subjects. Thus, the primary rationale behind reification (substantialisation, objectivisation or essentialisation) of culture is not the reinforcement of the sense of communality; it is rather an alternative way of doing politics, making use of identity, culture, ethnicity, past and tradition. When minorities are not permitted by the dominant political and legal structure to use legitimate political institutions like the parliament and political parties to do politics, those groups then tend to affiliate themselves with politics of identity highlighting their cultural, ethnic and/or religious particularities.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my students, Umut Aksoy and Yenal Bilgici, and their families for their support and hospitality during the fieldwork. I also thank the Population Council ME Awards in Cairo for their financial support without which I could not have conducted the research. I would like to express my gratitude to the members of the Democratic Circassian Platform for their support throughout the whole journey. And the last but not least, I thank Catherine Campion, Emre Işık, Bianca Kaiser, Jacqueline Stevens and Harry Tzimitras for their valuable remarks and critiques of this work.

Notes

[1] The journey was made into a documentary film by Şehval Şenyurt and Bülent Arınlı, who accompanied the team throughout the entire journey.
[2] The name Cherkess is probably a Turkic corruption of the Greek name ‘Kerxetai’, or it may mean ‘bandit’ (Jaimoukha 2001: 12).
[3] My trip to the Caucasus was very beneficial in revealing how the repatriates from Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Kosovo encountered the homeland, and to what extent their expectations about the homeland have come true. As the main concern of this work is not repatriates, I will just make some general remarks about returnees in the Adygei Republic, Karacay-Cherkesk, and Kabardino-Balkar Republic. The total number of returnees in Maykop is around 500 people (200 from Turkey, 160 from Kosovo, 120 from Syria and Jordan, and others); around 1000 in Nalchik (300 from Turkey, 600 from Syria and Jordan, and others). There are almost no returnees in Cherkesk. In both Maykop and Nalchik, the returnees have developed their own social networks since they are excluded by the local Adygeis. The locals label the returnees according to the country from which they have come: Turkish, Syrian, Kosovar, Jordanian etc. The returnees, perceived as distinct and different by the locals, complain of their lack of belonging, both in the homeland and diaspora: ‘Circassian’ in diaspora, ‘Turkish’ in the homeland. There is a visible difference between the returnees in Maykop and Nalchik. Those in Maykop are usually those who considered the return to be an ideological struggle, whereas the ones in Nalchik are generally those who are more business-minded people. The number of Adygei-speaking people in the capital cities of the Circassian Republics is as follows. The approximate population in Maykop is 170,000 (22 per cent Adygei), Cherkesk 150,000 (15 per cent Adygei), and Nalchik 330,000.000 (55 per cent Adygei and Abkhazin). Maykop is an agricultural city, Cherkesk industrial, and Nalchik is both agricultural and industrial. Relatively speaking, living standards are highest in Nalchik, and lowest in Cherkesk where deprivation prevails.
[4] For further information about the Circassian diaspora in Jordan and the returnees, see Shami (1995, 1998, 2000).
[5] Ethnic associations play an instrumental role in the processes of construction and articulation of Circassian diasporic identity. They also serve as what Diane Crane (1972) calls ‘invisible colleges’ functioning as informal scientific institutions whereby individuals add more to their accumulation of knowledge. Circassian associations as well as many other ethnic associations fit very well into the category of ‘invisible colleges’ where Circassians reproduce their cultural continuity in the urban space along with Circassian customs and traditions.
[6] Zekes literally means gatherings, which usually last until the early morning hours with games, music, dances and courtship (Ertem 2000: 328–35).
[7] Many of these groups are indigenous entities of Anatolia. However, there are also several groups migrating to Turkey such as Circassians, Balkan Muslims, White Russians, Iranians, Iraqi Kurds, and Afghans. For a detailed explanation of the migration to and from Turkey, see Özbay and Yücel (2001).
[8] During the founding years of the Turkish Republic, there were both royalist and republican Circassian groups in Anatolia. The Royalists were highly concentrated around the southern districts of the Marmara region. The reason why Abkhaz groups in the region still have a concrete Abkhazian identity is partly due to their historically defined peculiarities, which set them apart from their kin living outside the region. Having a rather Royalist and religious identity in the past and comprising a homogenous Abkhazian population in the region, these groups do not identify temselves as ‘Circassian’. Their primary identity is Abkhazian as opposed to the other Abkhaz groups I encountered in Samsun, Amasya, Çorum and Kayseri.
[9] The North Caucasus was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire between the mid-sixteenth century and mid-nineteenth century. The Ottomans never attempted to force Islam on the Circassians, preferring to convert them through evangelism. However, the Ottomans did not have a direct relationship with the Circassians at the time Crimea was annexed by the Russians in 1783. The Ottomoans preferred to control the Circassians through the Crimean Khans, who were of Turkic origin. Hence, after the Crimea was taken by the Russians, the Ottomans themselves had to control the Circassians. For a detailed account of the history of the Ottomans in the North Caucasus, see Gökçe (1979).
[10] One of the main earlier destinations for the Circassian diaspora was Rumelia. Circassians were settled in Constance, Varna, Sofia, Pristina, Kosovo, Plevne and surrounding regions (Pinson 1972). Yet, after the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–78 was lost, most of the Circassians re-migrated from Rumelia to Anatolia (mostly to the southern Marmara region) and to the Middle East (mostly to the Golan Heights). Circassian migration to the Middle East gained acceleration when there was no land left in Anatolia and Rumelia for settlement. The first Circassian settlement in the region dates back to 1871. These migrants were accommodated in Aleppo and the province of Damascus; subsequently, the newcomers were located around the Golan Heights and Amman. The numbers increased especially after the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–78, arriving in two major groups. One group came by boat to Turkey’s Black Sea ports before continuing overland to Syria with a stop-over in Kayseri (Uzunyayla). The other group was withdrawn from Rumeli due to the ongoing war. Recent figures show that there are approximately 60,000 Circassians in Jordan (mostly Shapsugh, Chechen and Kabardian), 40,000 in Syria (mostly Abzekh, Kabardian and Abkhaz), and 3,000 in Israel (mostly Shapsugh and Akbhaz).
[11] Religious beliefs in the North Caucasus had until the early nineteenth century been centred round a backbone of polytheism, paganism and animism with some Christian and Muslim influences. For more information on Circassian religion and Nart Mythology, see Jaimoukha (2001: 137–55).
[12] Khabze is a Circassian word which refers to rule, tradition and/or custom.
[13] Haynape is a Circassian word which is used to refer to those unmannerly and disgraceful acts not ethically and religiously acceptable in the community: not standing up when someone comes into the room is haynape; or interrupting an elder person speaking…
[14] Thamade is a Circassian term which refers to the older men in the community, who deserve special respect for their age, wisdom and experience.
[15] Düğün is a Turkish term, which refers to parties signifying a man and woman’s union in marriage. The term is used more broadly among the Circassians to refer to all occasions bringing young men and women together. See Ertem (2000: 327).
[16] Kashen, or psetluk, refers to a young man who expresses his interest in a young woman. A Kashen relationship does not necessarily result in marriage; nor does it entail an intimate relationship in the form of a boyfriend–girlfriend relationship. It is rather a verbal and emotional practice, which intimates flirtation by giving male competitiveness the upper hand in its implementation. For further information about the term, see Ertem (2000).
[17] Semerkho refers to the gendered interactions, games, conversations and courtship in the form of joking or teasing. It is usually undertaken by unmarried men and women to expose one’s interest, attraction and desire towards the other through ritualised acts.
[18] ‘Istanbulako’ or ‘psishxo yicijj’ has become a very popular form of music developed and vocalised by the people in exile. ‘Istanbulako’ refers to the act of crossing the Black Sea on the way to Istanbul, the mythical capital of the Islamic world from which the Circassians were expecting aid. This journey was vocalised with many melodies before and after the act of journeying itself.
[19] For instance, when Sultan Abdulaziz decided to accommodate the Kabardians in Uzunyayla (Kayseri), he encountered strong resistance from the Turcomans who had previously settled there. The resistance resulted in many casualties among the Circassians. For further information see Habiçoğlu (1993: 167–9).
[20] Mübadil (exchange) is an Arabic term used to refer to those migrants of Turkish origin from Greece exchanged with people of Greek origin from Turkey after the Lausanne Treaty in 1924. For further explanation see Aktar (2000).
[21] Muhacir is also an Arabic term used to refer to the Turkish migrants coming from the Balkans.
[22] Interviews indicate that the average marriage age for Circassian women in Turkey is 25–30, for men 30–35 in cities, younger in rural areas. These age intervals are higher than the other groups in Turkey. Such a pattern is only true for the Turkish Circassians, but not for the Circassians in the homeland or those in Jordan, Syria and Israel. Gönül Ertem (2000) has similar findings in her ethnographic work specialising in the Circassian community networks in Eskisehir, a city in mid-west Turkey.
[23] Zurna is a kind of authentic Middle Eastern musical instrument having a flute-like body with shrill pipe usually accompanied by a drum.
[24] In her ethnographic research comparing migrants of Turkish origin from Creete and Bulgaria, Belkıs Kümbetoğlu finds that orientation to ‘patrie’, ‘flag’, ‘religion’ and ‘language’ becomes essential for those newcomers to be recognised and accepted by the Sunni Muslim Turkish locals. See Kümbetoğlu (2001).
[25] Christianity actually preceded Islam in the regions starting from the reign of Emperor Justinian in the sixth century. Primarily, the Greek Orthodox Church and later in the fifteenth century the Catholic Church became influential, especially in the western coasts of the region.
[26] The first association, Dost Eli Yardimlasma Dernegi, was established in 1946 in collaboration with Azeri Turks. This was at a time when the Caucasian aspect was being underlined by the Circassian elite. During the Cold War period, these associations gained an anti-Sovietic character. Nevertheless, having a culturalist discourse, Kuzey Kafkasya Kültür Derneği (Northern Caucasia Culture Association), which was established in Ankara (1964), distinguished Circassian identity from the Turkish ethnic legacy. Kafkas Derneği (Kaf-Der, Caucasian Association) established in 1993 as an umbrella organisation, constitutes the largest Circassian associational network in Turkey. Kaf-Der has 34 branches in many cities throughout the country and its headquarters are located in Ankara. Kaf-Der goes beyond traditional culturalist discourse by committing itself to different projects such as political representation of the Circassian diaspora in Turkey and their adaptation to urban life. Kaf-Der has a liberal-nationalist discourse and places special emphasis on Circassian identity. There are two other major associations founded in 1995, Kafkas Vakfı (Caucasian Foundation) and Birleşik Kafkasya Derneği (United Caucasian Association). These two associations are Islamic-oriented and pursue the idea of establishing an Islamic confederation in the Northern Caucasus. They are also engaged in the Chechen independence movement against the Russian authorites. It should also be noted that these organisations are recently more passive as the official policy of Turkey towards the Chechen issue has partly shifted at the expense of the Chechen side. Thus, the activities of these associations are under the strict supervision of Turkish official bodies. In addition, there are approximately 80 different associations throughout the country. For a detailed explanation concerning Circassian ethnic associations see Taymaz (2001) and Toumarkine (2001).

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